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use#LAAT here has been a widespread change in
the thinking on arms control in the last
year or so. Much of it is due to the focus
of attention on “measures to safeguard
against surprise attack” (to use the of-
½cial terminology). Although this sub-
ject is still listed anachronistically un-
der “disarmament,” it is differently ori-
ented. It assumes deterrence as the key-
stone of our security policy, and tries to
improve it. It accepts a retaliatory capa-
bility as something to be enhanced, not
degraded–something to be made more
secure, less accident-prone, less in need
of striking quickly to avoid its own de-
struction, less capable of gaining advan-
tage from a sudden attack of its own. 
An anomaly of this approach to arms
control is that it does not necessarily
involve “disarmament” in the literal
sense.
Another anomaly, which rather shakes
the disarmament tradition, is that weap-
ons may be more stabilizing and less ag-
gressive if they are capable of civilian
reprisal rather than of military engage-
ment. A standoff between two retalia-
tory forces is in some ways equivalent 
to an exchange of hostages; and “inhu-
mane” weapons, capable of inflicting
damage but not able to go after the ene-
my’s strategic forces, acquire virtue be-
cause of their clearly deterrent function
and the lack of temptation they give ei-
ther side to strike ½rst.
More important, though, is the fact
that schemes to avert surprise attack 
are manifestly compatible with a nation-
al military policy, not a renunciation of
it. They emphasize the possibility that
one can simultaneously think seriously
and sympathetically about our military
posture and about collaborating with
our enemies to improve it. To propose,
as does the notion of “measures to safe-
guard against surprise attack,” that mil-
itary cooperation with potential ene-
mies may offer opportunities to improve
our military posture, opens a new ½eld
for imaginative scienti½c and military
thinking, and may eventually enlist the
support of the military services them-
selves.
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& SciencesMost of this progress is still ahead of
us; the revolution in thinking about
arms control is barely started. Of½cial-
ly we have taken only the most hesitant
steps in de½ning arms control in a way
that does not contradict our national se-
curity policies. We still talk of½cially as
though “disarmament” can only save
money, without noticing that under the
new philosophy it could cost more. We
still work of½cially with an image of dis-
armament that makes it solely a peace-
time (cold-wartime) process of negoti-
ating explicit detailed agreements in a
multinational context for the reduction
or elimination of weapons, without ad-
equately recognizing that, as in limit-
ing war, limiting the arms race can be a
more tacit and less formal process than
the “treaty” idea implies. More impor-
tant, the prevalent image of disarma-
ment is still one that gives the process a
uniquely de½ned end point–the point of
no arms at all, or virtually none except in
the hands of some international authori-
ty or synthetic state that would have the
power to police the world against inter-
national violence but against nothing
else.
The cautious and the skeptical, the
pessimists and the realists, have doubts
about how rapidly that end point can 
be approached, whether it will be ap-
proached at all, and whether the pro-
cess once started may not be reversed.
But the ultimate goal is rarely challenged
except by those who have no interest in
arms control. And by far the most fre-
quent argument raised in favor of par-
ticular limited measures of arms con-
trol, perhaps the most widely persua-
sive, is that these limited measures are 
at least “steps toward” the goal of ulti-
mate disarmament. We have not faced
up to the implications of the anomaly
that “measures to safeguard against sur-
prise attack” are designed to preserve a
nuclear striking power, and are not easily
construed as just another “step toward”
ultimate disarmament.1
We still talk about “levels” of arma-
ment or disarmament, as though there
were only two directions in which to go,
up and down, the arms race going in one
direction and arms control in the other.
We have not yet admitted that, even in
the framework of arms control, it could
be an open question whether we ought
to be negotiating with our enemies for
more arms, less arms, different kinds of
arms, or arrangements superimposed on
existing armaments. We have given little
thought even to the weapon system that
would be required by that ultimate inter-
national authority that might police the
world against armed violence, and to
whether it, too, would be embarrassed
by a “massive retaliation” doctrine that
would lack credibility; whether it, too,
might be subject to surprise attack;
whether it, too, would lack resolution
(as some think nato might lack resolu-
tion) to reach an awful collective deci-
sion in response to nibbling aggression
or bland violation.
The point of this paper is that there 
is a vast new area to be explored once 
we break out of the traditional con½ne-
ment of “disarmament”–the entire area
of military collaboration with potential
enemies to reduce the likelihood of war
or to reduce its scope and violence. It 
is an area worth exploring because our
present military policies and prospects,
however we feel about the adequacy 
of current programs, cannot promise
security from a major thermonuclear
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1  See T. C. Schelling, “Surprise Attack and Dis-
armament,” in Klaus Knorr, ed., nato and
American Security (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton
University Press, 1959), or the shorter version
in T. C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict (Cam-
bridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1960),
chap. 10.war; and even modest improvements
achieved through cooperation with the
Soviets should be welcome.
It is not true that in the modern world
a gain for the Russians is necessarily a
loss for us, and vice versa. We can both
suffer losses, and this fact provides scope
for cooperation. We both have–unless
the Russians have already determined 
to launch an attack and are preparing 
for it–a common interest in reducing
the advantage of striking ½rst, simply be-
cause that very advantage, even if com-
mon to both sides, increases the likeli-
hood of war. If at the expense of some
capability for launching surprise attack
one can deny that capability to the other,
it may be a good bargain. We both have a
common interest in avoiding the kind of
false alarm, panic, misunderstanding, or
loss of control, that may lead to an un-
premeditated war, in a situation aggra-
vated by the recognition on both sides
that it is better to go ½rst than to go sec-
ond. We have a common interest in not
getting drawn or provoked or panicked
into war by the actions of a third party
(whether that party intends the result 
or not). And we may have an interest 
in saving some money by not doing on
both sides the things that, if we both do
them, tend to cancel out.
This common interest does not de-
pend on trust and good faith. In fact it
seems likely that unless thoroughgoing
distrust can be acknowledged on both
sides, it may be hard to reach any real
understanding on the subject. The intel-
lectual clarity required to recognize the
nature of the common interest may be
incompatible with the pretense that we
trust each other, or that there is any se-
quence of activities in the short run by
which either side could demonstrate its
good faith to the other.
Ancient despotisms may have under-
stood better than we do how to tranquil-
ize relations between them while hating
and distrusting. They exchanged hos-
tages, drank wine from the same glass,
met in public to inhibit the massacre of
one by the other, and even deliberately
exchanged spies to facilitate transmittal
of authentic information. And perhaps,
having exchanged a son for a daughter 
in the cold-blooded interest of contract
enforcement, they may have reduced
tension suf½ciently to permit a little af-
fection to grow up in later generations.
T he premise underlying my point of
view is that a main determinant of the
likelihood of war is the nature of pres-
ent military technology. We and the Rus-
sians are trapped by our military tech-
nology. Weapon developments of the
last ½fteen years, especially of the last
seven or eight, have themselves been re-
sponsible for the most alarming aspects
of the present strategic situation. They
have enhanced the advantage, in the
event war should come, of being the 
one to start it. They have inhumanly
compressed the time available to make
the most terrible decisions. They have
almost eliminated any belief that a really
big war either could be or should be lim-
ited in scope or brought to a close by any
process other than the sheer exhaustion
of weapons. They have greatly reduced
the con½dence of either side that it can
predict the weapons its enemy has or
will have in the future. In these and oth-
er ways the evolution of military tech-
nology has exacerbated whatever pro-
pensities toward war are inherent in the
political conflict between us and our en-
emies. It might be naïve to say that this
is an unmixed evil for both us and the
Soviets, since it powerfully affects the
bilateral contest between us; neverthe-
less, it is hard to escape the judgment
that nature might have been kinder in
the way she let our military technology




stabilizationunfold itself over the last decade and a
half.
It is interesting–more than that, it 
is useful–to ask what technological
achievements (available both to us and
to our enemies) we wish had never oc-
curred, and what technological failures
we wish had turned out otherwise. Do
we wish the hydrogen bomb had never
come along to make intercontinental
missiles economical? Do we wish that
nuclear-powered aircraft had made air-
borne alert so cheap that retaliatory 
aircraft could stay aloft rather than be
vulnerable on the ground to a missile
attack? Do we hope that no one ever dis-
covers an economical means of nullify-
ing ballistic-missile submarines, so that
neither side can hope to preclude retalia-
tion by sudden attack? Do we wish that
warning systems were so nearly perfect
that “false alarm” were virtually impos-
sible, or so poor that we could never be
tempted to rely on them? Do we wish
that missiles had never become so accu-
rate that they could be used to destroy 
an enemy’s missiles in an effort to ne-
gate an enemy’s retaliatory threat? Do
we wish that radioactive fallout could
not occur, or do we welcome it as a pe-
culiarly retaliatory (and hence deter-
rent) weapon effect that is of little use 
in a preemptive attack? Do we wish that
secrecy about weapons and weapon pro-
duction were much more dif½cult to
maintain than it is, or welcome certain
kinds of secrecy as a form of mutually
appreciated security against surprise
attack?
The reason why it is productive to
speculate on these questions, rather 
than merely fanciful, is that arms con-
trol can usefully be thought of as a way
of changing some of the answers. In ad-
dition to what we can do unilaterally 
to improve our warning, to maintain
close control over our forces, to make
our forces more secure against attack, 
to avoid the need for precipitate deci-
sions, and to avoid accidents or the mis-
taken decisions that they might cause,
there may be opportunities to exchange
facilities or understandings with our en-
emies, or to design and deploy our forces
differently by agreement with our ene-
mies who do likewise, in a way that en-
hances those aspects of technology we
like and that helps to nullify those that
we do not.
If we wish that radar were better and
cheaper and less limited by the Earth’s
curvature, we might make it so by ex-
changing real estate with the Russians
for the construction by each of us of
observation posts on each other’s soil. 
If we hope that no one can ever predict
with con½dence how his own missiles
would do, in a surprise attack, against
the hardened missile sites of his oppo-
nent, we might deny each other the nec-
essary knowledge by banning tests of
large weapons in the era in which any-
one actually has a missile in a hard un-
derground site that he could use in a
weapon-effects test. If instead we wish
that each side might preserve the priva-
cy of its railroad lines for mobile mis-
siles, we might jointly eschew certain
surveillance techniques; and if we
thought that antimissile defenses of
missile sites might be more feasible, 
and retaliatory forces correspondingly
less vulnerable, with the further testing
of nuclear weapons and their effects, we
might look with more favor on contin-
ued weapon testing. These considera-
tions are by no means the whole story 
in arms control, but they do remind us
that we and our enemies can both joint-
ly welcome, or jointly deplore, certain
technological developments (like the
improved accuracy of long-range mis-
siles) and may possibly ½nd ways, joint-
ly, to enhance them or to offset them,
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do unilaterally.
T hese examples suggest some of the
criteria that can be applied to limited
arms-control schemes, and some of the
dif½culties in implementing them. As 
to criteria, the ½rst thing to emphasize 
is that it takes a good deal of strategic
analysis to decide whether a particular
limitation or augmentation of weapons
or facilities is a good one or a bad one.
Viewing limited measures on their indi-
vidual merits, and not as steps in a com-
prehensive program that can be justi½ed
only by a long sequence of steps to fol-
low, one has to ask whether the techno-
logical and economic consequences of
a particular scheme are or are not con-
ducive to military stability; and the an-
swer is very unlikely to be closely cor-
related with whether more weapons 
or fewer weapons are involved, bigger
weapons or smaller ones, or even wheth-
er notions of “more” and “less,” “big-
ger” and “smaller,” can be applied.
Whether we would like to see reconnais-
sance satellites banned or encouraged
may depend, for example, on whether
we think they will mainly provide target-
ing information to the initiator of war 
or mainly provide warning to a potential
defender so that a potential attacker is
the more deterred. Whether we like big
missiles or not may depend on whether
we believe, as so many believed a few
years ago, that missiles would be simple
and sturdy and hard to destroy in their
underground sites or believe as so many
fear now that increased accuracies and
yields make the present generation of
missiles better for a ½rst strike than for 
a second strike. Whether we wish mis-
sile technology to be advanced or retard-
ed may depend on whether or not we be-
lieve, as many do, that the next genera-
tion of missiles will be easier to protect,
easier to hide, or easier to keep moving,
and therefore less insecure. Whether 
one welcomes nuclear-powered ballistic-
missile submarines on both sides or de-
plores them depends on whether they
seem to be peculiarly good at surviving
and retaliating, and hence “deterrent,”
or peculiarly good at getting up close 
for a no-warning strike on an enemy’s
retaliatory power. And if it were some-
how possible to enforce a ban on “dir-
ty” bombs, there would still be a gen-
uine strategic question of whether or 
not we wish deterrent capabilities to be
enhanced by the greater punitive power
of dirty bombs, recognizing that com-
paratively slow-acting fallout may be of
much less utility to a potential attacker,
whose main interest is to minimize re-
taliation on himself.
T he fact that developments such as
these require strategic analysis before 
it can be decided whether they are good
or bad is, aside from being true, discour-
aging. It means that even among the ex-
perts there will be disagreement about
the consequences of any particular pro-
hibition or exchange of military facili-
ties; it may be next to impossible to get
widespread understanding of the rele-
vant arguments, even within govern-
ments. And if fairly detailed analysis is
required, and careful distinctions have
to be made, prohibitions might have 
to be speci½ed in equally careful detail
and with equally ½ne distinctions. This
is certainly an obstacle to negotiation.
Furthermore, any analysis–and any pro-
hibition or agreement or exchange of
facilities that is justi½ed on the basis of
such analysis–is subject to rapid obso-
lescence. The friendly warning satellite
appears, a year later, as a vicious target-
ing aid to the surprise attacker; the net-
work of warning systems originally de-
signed for mutual reassurance proves in




stabilizationoperation to have too high a false-alarm
rate; the missile-guidance systems that
we deplored because of their extreme
accuracy and the advantage they would
give the attacker may prove, after we
outlaw them, to have been the main
hope for mobile missile systems desired
for their invulnerability and hence for
their stability. By the time we reach
agreement on precisely what to allow in
our satellites, where to place our radar,
or what missiles to ban, new evidence or
new analysis comes along to suggest that
the justi½cation of the particular scheme
we are about to subscribe to is all wrong.
Finally, by the time we look at individ-
ual schemes in suf½cient detail to judge
whether their strategic implications are
“good” for both us and our enemies, we
may have narrowed them down to the
point where they are intolerably biased.
It is probably a mathematically sound
principle that the more measures we put
in a package, the more their bilateral bi-
ases will cancel out, and hence the great-
er will be the joint gain relative to the
competitive advantage. This may mean
that once a potential arms-control sys-
tem is dissected into suf½ciently small
pieces to apply the right kind of analy-
sis, we shall have more individual bar-
gaining counters too small and too bi-
ased for the negotiating process.
T he recent negotiations on weapon
tests may prove to be typical. First, there
has been almost no public discussion of
whether the further testing of weapons
and weapon effects would really be con-
ducive to the development of greater bi-
lateral military stability or instability
over the coming years.2Even if the pub-
lic could be got interested in this crucial
question, it would be unlikely to have
the information it would need to judge
the answer. (There has been a good deal
of public discussion of the merits and
possible demerits of preventing the fur-
ther spread of nuclear weapons to small
countries, but remarkably little discus-
sion of just how a test ban would ob-
struct the spread.) Second, while it may
seem a mischievous stroke of fortune
that somebody discovered, between 
the two conferences, facts or ideas that
made the policing of a test ban appear
more dif½cult than it had appeared the
year before, this may be exactly what we
have to expect in every case. If today we
had “completely solved” the new techni-
cal problems introduced by the “decou-
pling” technique, we should still have to
be prepared for somebody’s discovering
next year a new possibility that had been
overlooked, one that contemporary de-
tection technology could not yet cope
with.
The test-ban discussions also illustrate
that, when an issue has been narrowed
down, the bias in the advantages may
seem to outweigh the joint advantages.
There is more controversy, and under-
standably so, over whether a prohibition
on small-weapon tests is in the Ameri-
can interest, than on whether a prohibi-
tion covering the whole spectrum is.
But of all the characteristics of the
present test-ban negotiations, the most
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2  That is, whether further testing would main-
ly facilitate the development of more secure re-
taliatory weapon systems with better commu-
nication and control, less subject to accident
and false alarm, or instead would mainly en-
hance the potency of weapons for preemptive
attack and aggravate the urge, when in doubt,
to strike quickly and without restraint. The an-
swer is by no means obvious for the period im-
mediately ahead. It should be noted that tests
involve not only new-weapon performance but
weapon effects on previously untested targets,
and the latter may be especially relevant to
such things as anti-icbm defense, civil defense,
and the vulnerability of ½xed or mobile weap-
ons, warning systems, and communication and
control systems.signi½cant may be that we have had a
moratorium for some time without a
formal agreement. (We do not, of
course, have rights of inspection; so we
cannot be sure that the moratorium has
been kept; but it likely has been, except
possibly for the most easily disguised
tests.) And this moratorium resulted
from no detailed negotiations, no care-
ful speci½cations, and no written docu-
ments to be initialed and rati½ed. I do
not think this result can be wholly ex-
plained by the pressure of public opin-
ion. Part of the motivation must be that,
whatever one side is sacri½cing in im-
proved technology, the other side is also
foregoing tests, and each would proba-
bly resume them if the other did. Thus
the main sanction of an arms-control
agreement–the expectation that each
will abstain only if the other does–is
probably present in this case. It is there-
fore a genuine instance of “arms con-
trol.” If it suffers from being tentative,
temporary, quali½ed, and conditional, so
might any arms-control agreement, even
if duly negotiated and signed; further-
more, who can say yet that the present
“agreement,” if such we may call it, will
not be of some duration?
Here, I think, we have an important
clue to a process by which arms control
may be reached, and the kinds of arms
control that can be reached by that pro-
cess. Maybe arms control is destined to
be something more informal than is sug-
gested by the great diplomatic deploy-
ments in Geneva. Maybe limited meas-
ures of arms control can be arrived at by
quite indirect and incomplete communi-
cation; maybe they will take the form of
a proposal embodied in unilateral action
(or abstention from action), which con-
tinues if matched by corresponding ac-
tion on the other side and only for so
long as it is. Maybe instead of arguing
about what we should do, we will sim-
ply do it and dare the other side to do
likewise, or do it and quietly suggest that
we would like to keep it up, but only if
they ½nd it in their interest to do some-
thing comparable.
But if arms control is to be arrived at
by a more tacit and informal process,
and if we are going to call “arms con-
trol” any of the military things that we
and the Russians abstain from because
of an awareness that as long as each ab-
stains the other probably will too, we
should look around and see whether we
do not already have a good deal of arms
control. If we have, we should look at it
closely to see what lessons we can draw.
Offhand, it appears (but a more imagi-
native examination might prove other-
wise) that the tacit understandings we
have with the Russians concern what we
do with our weapons more than what we
possess.3We seem to have some under-
standings about traf½c rules for patrol-
ling bombers; there are apparently cer-
tain lines we stay on this side of, lines
the Russians presumably can recognize,
the crossing of which they can probab-
ly monitor to some extent. This is cer-
tainly a restraint that we unilaterally
observe in the interest of reducing mis-
understandings and alarms. As far as I
know, the traf½c rules are communicat-
ed, not explicitly, but simply by behav-





3  A possible exception is civil defense. The
extraordinary aversion to civil defense in the
U.S. government must be complex in its ex-
planation; but an element is very likely a be-
lief that a genuine civil defense program might
open up a new dimension of the arms race,
leading either to a “civil-defense race” with 
the ussr or just to an aggravation of the arms
competition. The same may be true in the
ussr. An interesting question is how much
“clandestine” civil defense the Russians are
undertaking, and their reasons for keeping it
private. (In pointing this out, the author is not
trying to justify the aversion to civil defense.)ing in accordance with them (perhaps
conspicuouslyin accordance with them)
and possibly by having chosen the divid-
ing lines in such a way that their signi½-
cance is recognizable. We both abstain
from harassing actions on each other’s
strategic forces; we do not jam each
other’s military communications, scare
each other with fallout from weapons
tests, or wage surreptitious peacetime
undersea wars of attrition.4We may 
yet develop tacit understandings about
zones and traf½c rules for submarines,
and may (or may not) develop a tradi-
tion for leaving each other’s reconnais-
sance satellites alone. We both very ob-
viously abstain from assassination. The
Russians recently “negotiated” (by a
process of nudging) a sharper under-
standing about sharing the Paci½c for
target practice. It remains to be seen
whether the U-2 incident causes certain
tacit or latent understandings to come
unstuck.5
In all likelihood we may abstain from
the use of nuclear weapons in some lim-
ited war, though both sides often seem
to denounce of½cially the notion that a
serious limited war should be, or could
be, fought without nuclear weapons.
Here is an interesting case of an arms
limitation that may be tacitly recognized
by both sides, and recognized only be-
cause each thinks the other may observe
it too, yet one that is not only not for-
mally agreed on but even denounced and
denied by both sides. It seems doubtful
whether this tacit understanding could
be made much stronger by a written
document.6A restraint on the use of
nuclear weapons may be more persua-
sive if it seems to rest on the enemy’s
own self-interest–on his understanding
that if he abstains we may too, but only
if he does–than if it pretends to rest on
the power of a written agreement or on a
½ction of “good faith.”
In fact, all of the tacitly agreed limits
that do apply, or may apply, in limited
war can be construed as a kind of infor-
mal arms control tacitly arrived at. My
impression is that we and the Russians
will go to some length to avoid having
American and Russian troops directly
engage each other in a limited war, sim-
ply because such an engagement might
create extremely unstable expectations
about whether the war could remain
limited. We and the Russians both rec-
ognize many legalistic limitations in
war, such as the distinction between
North Koreans and Chinese, between
volunteers and regulars, between the
provision of materials to an ally and the
provision of manpower, between doing
an ally’s reconnaissance for him and do-
ing his bombing, perhaps even the dis-
tinction between local air½elds that are
fair game because they are on the ground
within a disputed country and the decks
of carriers offshore that might for some
reason be construed as “sanctuary.”
108 Dædalus  Fall 2005
Thomas C.
Schelling
4  Not yet, that is, or not very much. Preserv-
ing some of the mutual restraints we now en-
joy may be as important an “arms-control”
objective as creating more.
5  It seems a correct interpretation that there 
is still some element of implicit understanding
about not transferring nuclear weapons to oth-
er countries. Its status is presently a great deal
more ambiguous than the author expected a
couple of years ago; nevertheless there must be
a general awareness on both sides that the re-
straint of either will be weakened or dissolved
by promiscuousness on the other’s part.
6  It could be made much stronger by various
unilateral actions. One would be to increase
our capability to get along without nuclears in
limited war. Another would be to add symbol-
ic support to the understanding; the test-ban
negotiations–especially if a formal agreement
is reached–almost certainly do this, whether
they are intended to or not.Most of these limits are arbitrary, con-
ventional, and casuistic–purely matters
of tradition and precedent. For that rea-
son they are uncertain and insecure; no-
body is even nominally committed to
honor them. But they demonstrate that
it is possible for potential enemies to ar-
rive tacitly, or by indirect communica-
tion, at a meeting of minds about some
rules, and about how to interpret inten-
tions through the way one operates and
deploys his resources. Most important,
the limits that can be observed in limit-
ed war are a powerful demonstration
that sheer self-interest–the recognition
of a need to collaborate with an enemy
in wartime, to reach understandings 
that transcend the formalities of explic-
it communication; the recognition of a
mutual interest in avoiding accidents,
incidents, misunderstandings and un-
necessary alarms, and in holding to any
constraints that can be found–can pro-
vide potent sanctions that need not rest
on explicit negotiation and formal agree-
ments.
We may, then, increase our under-
standing of the nature of arms control,
what it rests on and how it may come
about, by recognizing limited war as a
kind of arms control in itself. And per-
haps it differs from peacetime (i.e., cold-
war) arms control less than we custom-
arily think. Perhaps the psychology and
the sanctions and the mode of com-
munication, the kinds of reasoning in-
volved, the lack of formal agreement or
even acknowledgment, that typify lim-
ited war, represent a more central and
typical process of international negoti-
ation than we usually give it credit for.
There is another aspect of limited war
that deserves emphasis in this connec-
tion. The limits in limited war are ar-
rived at not by verbal bargaining, but by
maneuver, by actions, and by statements
and declarations that are not direct com-
munication to the enemy. Each side
tends to act in some kind of recogniz-
able pattern, so that any limits that it 
is actually observing can be appreciated
by the enemy; and each tries to perceive
what restraints the other is observing.
For that reason the limits themselves
must be clear-cut, must be of an “obvi-
ous” character, must be based on quali-
tative distinctions rather than matters 
of degree. They must not be too selec-
tive, too gerrymandered in discriminat-
ing between what is inside and what is
outside the limit. They must attach
themselves to benchmarks, demarca-
tion lines, and distinctions that come
naturally. They must have simplicity.
They must take advantage of conven-
tions and traditions and precedents that
exist, even if the precedents and tradi-
tions are biased between the two sides 
or a nuisance to both sides. Often they
must involve all-or-none distinctions, 
or across-the-board distinctions like that
between land and water, between mate-
rial and manpower, between two sides 
of a border, or even some arbitrary but
potent and highly suggestive feature like
a parallel of latitude.7
This is certainly true in the case of
the use of nuclear weapons in limited
war. It is enormously more likely that 
a limit against any use of nuclear weap-
ons could be recognized, sensed, and
adhered to by both sides on condition
that each other observe it, than that any
particular quantitative limitation, tar-
get limitation, ½ssion vs. fusion limita-
tion, or limitation based on who is the
“aggressor,” could be jointly and tacitly
converged on by the participants.





7  For an extensive analysis of tacit bargaining,
with special reference to limited war, see chap-
ters 3 and 4 and Appendix A of T. C. Schelling,
The Strategy of Conflict (Cambridge, Mass.: Har-
vard University Press, 1960).But the same is certainly true of a test
suspension. A tacitly reached moratori-
um on testing nuclear weapons–mutual
and reciprocal but essentially unilateral
on both sides–is much more likely to be
stable and durable, much less likely to be
eroded by ambiguous behavior, than a
selective moratorium. If we and the Rus-
sians are very selective in our unilateral
restraints, each choosing the particular
yields, altitudes, ½ssion-fusion combina-
tions, and localities for tests, it seems
unlikely either that both sides will hit on
the same limitations and maintain them
with con½dence, or that both will hit on
“equivalent” though different restraints.
To some extent, then, the gains and
losses of a particular agreement, i.e., the
way any particular understanding that is
reached may discriminate between the
two parties (or among more than two
parties), are likely to be dictated some-
what by the elements of the problem,
and not altogether by the detailed pref-
erences of the parties to the understand-
ing or their bargaining skill. An absolute
ban on weapon tests, for example, or any
other across-the-board prohibition, is
somewhat arbitrary in the way it distrib-
utes the advantages; but perhaps some
of its appeal is precisely in the fact that 
it is somewhat arbitrary, somewhat de-
termined by chance or by the very struc-
ture of the problem, dictated by circum-
stances rather than by either side to the
other.
If an important part of our arms con-
trol–or let us call it “mutual arms ac-
commodation”–with our enemies is
going to be tacit and informal, a matter
of reciprocated unilateral actions and
abstentions, we need to take seriously
the problem of communicating with our
enemies about what we are doing, and of
reaching understandings with them. In
some respects informal communication
is easier, in some ways harder; the pro-
cess is different from that of formal, ex-
plicit, detailed negotiation, and imposes
different requirements. Informal com-
munication is usually ambiguous; a gov-
ernment speaks by hint as well as by
overt statement and proposal, it speaks
indirectly through the medium of press
conferences, leaks of information, and
remarks to third parties. It speaks with
many voices, in the executive branch, 
in the congress, and even in private arti-
cles and news stories that are “inspired”
or are inferred to be so. And it speaks
through the actions it takes.8
The differences should not be exagger-
ated; even when large teams of profes-
sional diplomats and technical experts
are assembled in Geneva, much of the
communication takes these other forms.
Nevertheless, the strategy of communi-
cation is different, particularly because
of the greater need in informal negoti-
ations to reach a real understanding. In
formal and explicit negotiation, what
eventually matters is to a large extent
what gets written down and agreed to;
even if there was not a meeting of
minds, there may have been a meeting 
of words that provides a record of the
expectations of both sides and the obli-
gations perceived. In informal negotia-
tion the ultimate sanction depends less
on a piece of paper than on the clarity 
of the understanding reached. If one be-
haves in a particular way, in anticipation
of the other’s reciprocation, there is a
need to make clear precisely how one is
behaving, with what mutual purpose in
mind, so that the other can read the pro-
posal in it, infer what would constitute
reciprocation, and design its own behav-
ior accordingly.
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8  In a sense, the abortive summit conference of
May 1960 did not involve less “negotiation” just
because the meeting never took place.There is furthermore a greater need to
be persuasive. In explicit negotiation, it
may be possible to reach an agreement
whose terms are reasonably well under-
stood without agreement on principles
or any reciprocal understanding of each
other’s motives. If the letter of the agree-
ment is clear, the spirit can remain
somewhat in doubt. In informal negotia-
tion, the spirit bears most of the burden;
and if the ideabehind what we think we
are doing is not perceived by our partner
(enemy), what we expect of him–or
what we may reasonably be expected to
expect of him–may be too dimly per-
ceived to be the basis for genuine recip-
rocation.
Suppose we decide to put more em-
phasis on ballistic-missile submarines,
for example, in the belief that they are
peculiarly “stable” weapons because of
their lesser susceptibility to destruction
in case of a surprise attack and because
they are not so much under obligation 
to strike quickly in the event of an am-
biguous warning (or war itself), or else
because their smaller warheads, with
possibly a lesser degree of accuracy as
compared with ground-based missiles,
makes them less of a threat to the ene-
my’s retaliatory forces and more of a
genuine deterrent. Suppose we decide
that we could afford to do this only if
the enemy himself oriented his own
strategic program toward similarly “sta-
ble” weapon systems. It might not be 
at all clear to the Russians what our mo-
tives are, or what the conditions were for
our going through with the program. Or
suppose we have a crash program for the
development of a more secure ground-
based missile force, this program to be
½nanced by a sharp increase in the de-
fense budget, with a good deal of expen-
diture on command, control, and com-
munication arrangements so as to re-
duce both the vulnerability of our weap-
ons and their sensitivity to accident or
false alarm. In particular, suppose that
our budget rises because of increased
outlays associated with our desire for 
a slowreacting force, rather than one 
that must react rapidly. In such circum-
stances, our actions may be stabilizing
or destabilizing, depending on whether
the enemy can perceive that we are mak-
ing the world safer for him rather than
increasing his need (and ours) to jump
the gun in a crisis. If we institute an air-
borne alert, it may be important to do 
so in a way that enhances the apparent
as well as the real security and stabili-
ty of our retaliatory weapon systems.
This might mean that we would have to
choose deliberately, say, flight patterns
that manifestly enhance the security of
our forces rather than the speed with
which they could initiate a surprise
attack of their own.
By far the most important prerequisite
is that we understand our own motives
well enough to take actions that are con-
sistent with a deterrent philosophy, and
well enough so that we can articulate it
to ourselves. If we have such a philoso-
phy, and if our actions are consistent
with it, and if for our own purposes we
articulate that philosophy in explaining
our budget decisions here at home, we
are probably well on the way to convey-
ing that philosophy persuasively to our
enemy, if he is at all receptive. A special
problem here is that our overt position
on disarmament must not be too incon-
sistent with the philosophy that we are
trying to display and get across to our
enemy. If, for example, we really be-
lieved in a policy of collaborating with
the Russians to develop a stable situa-
tion of mutual deterrence, and if we de-
termined to make important changes, 
to this end, in the con½guration of our
weapons but these changes were not in
the direction of general disarmament,




stabilizationwe would put a double burden on our
communication if the front we present-
ed on arms-control questions bore no
relation to that philosophy. This does
not necessarily mean that we have to
speak in our formal disarmament di-
plomacy in a manner that is sincere and
consistent with what we are fundamen-
tally trying to get across to the Russians.
It may just mean that our insincerity
should be as manifest as the inconsis-
tency, so that when we do contradict
ourselves the Russians know that this 
is for show and that they should look 
for the real message elsewhere. Still, it
would help if we could ½nd the diplo-
matic courage to shift even the formal
discussions of arms control more into
accord with our basic military policy, 
at the same time as we try to adapt that
military policy in directions that the
Russians can appreciate and reciprocate,
so that disarmament negotiations can
help a little, or at least hinder as little as
possible, the development of a genuine
understanding.
Even so, it is still an unanswered ques-
tion whether the Russians are at all dis-
posed to participate in any “mutual arms
accommodation” with us, beyond what
we already do in a tacit way. And it is a
dif½cult technical question whether,
even if they are disposed to cooperate
with us and appreciate the principle of
stable retaliatory systems with mini-
mum proclivity toward false alarm and
minimum temptation toward surprise
attack, there are any promising actions
to be undertaken. Weapon systems can
rarely be classi½ed indisputably as ½rst-
strike or second-strike weapons, as “ac-
cident-prone” or “accident-proof”; a
good deal of technical analysis has to lie
behind a judgment, many of the techni-
cal judgments may not be made equally
by us and our enemies, the judgment has
to be made in the context of an evolving
weapon system for which facts are really
only forecasts, and what is known today
may no longer be true tomorrow. It is,
furthermore, too much to expect the
massive bureaucracy of our defense es-
tablishment and our foreign service, 
and the partisan conflicts in Congress, 
to produce and maintain a coherent phi-
losophy and transmit it with high ½deli-
ty to a suspicious enemy whose receptiv-
ity and reasoning processes we can only
poorly evaluate. But it is worth trying.
One possibility, already adverted to, 
is to design our military forces conspic-
uously and deliberately in the direction
of deterrence, stability, and slow reac-
tion. That is, to articulate as a policy the
design of a strategic force that is pecu-
liarly good at waiting out crises, at sur-
viving a surprise attack, and at punish-
ing an attacker ex post facto, and not par-
ticularly good at initiating a preventive
attack, not in need of responding rapidly
to warning.
This may not be a bad policy to follow
unilaterally; but the advantage of pursu-
ing it is greater if the enemy pursues it
too. The more each side perceives the
other as designing his force for a sudden
preemptive attack in a crisis, or for a pre-
meditated surprise attack, the more one
is tempted himself to develop a quick-
reacting system, one that is peculiarly
suited to catching the enemy’s military
forces before they have left the ground.
Thus to some extent such a policy is a
conditional policy; the motive is great-
er if the principle is reciprocated by the
enemy.
It would be extraordinarily dif½cult,
perhaps impossible, to negotiate a de-
tailed understanding of precisely what
kinds of weapons in what con½gura-
tions, and how deployed, would meet
the “stability” criterion. For that rea-
son the idea may not be one that lends
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agreements. But that does not rule out
the possibility that both sides may per-
ceive value in pursuing such policies in 
a general way, and may recognize that
their own behavior not only helps the
other side pursue a similar policy but
helps to induce it by the tacit promise 
of reciprocation. As mentioned above,
we already do this in such matters as 
the traf½c rules we both unilaterally ob-
serve and reciprocate; there may be a
good deal of room for gradually extend-
ing this kind of reciprocal unilateral ac-
tion, even though the subject may never
appear on the agenda of a diplomatic ne-
gotiation.
Compared with a peacefulworld dis-
armed, schemes to stabilize mutual de-
terrence are a poor second best; judged
against the prospect of war, measures to
make it less likely may be attractive. This
point of view will not appeal to any who
believe that war results from the sheer
existence of arms and the temptation to
use them, or from the influence of mili-
tarists in modern society whose prestige
increases in proportion to the arms bud-
get, and who believe that distrust is only
aggravated by people’s acting as though
distrust exists. History shows, it is said,
that man cannot live in a world with
arms without using them. History rare-
ly shows anything quite that universal;
but even granting it, the question is not
whether it is asking much of man to
learn to live in a world with arms and
not to use them excessively. The ques-
tion is whether it takes more skill and
wisdom for man to learn to live in a
world with arms and not to use them
than it does for man to disarm himself
so totally that he can’t have war even if
he wants it (or can’t want it any longer).
If modern social institutions are capa-
ble of achieving disarmament in the ½rst
place, and of avoiding arms races in per-
petuity thereafter, perhaps they are ca-
pable of supporting a world with arms
without war. Those who argue that
peace with arms is impossible but act 
as though peace and disarmament are
not, may be using a double standard.
And it must be remembered that to-
tal disarmament, even if achieved, does
not by itself preclude subsequent arms
races; nor does a good start toward total
disarmament preclude a violent reversal.
To the extent that an arms advantage is
more easily obtained when the level of
armaments on both sides is low–to the
extent that the consequences of cheating
are greater in a world with few arms–
arms races might become more violent,
the lower the level of armament from
which they start. Particularly in a world
in which the pace of scienti½c progress 
is rapid but jerky, uneven as between
countries, and full of opportunities and
uncertainties for weapons development,
it is not at all clear that the world would
be less uneasy about arms advantages if
each side continually thought of itself
as nearly naked. What can explain the
complacency of the American response
to the ½rst Soviet sputnik except a feel-
ing (superbly rationalized) that the ex-
isting level of arms provided so much
security that no single new achievement,
or even a revision of the comparative
time schedules by a year or two, could
quite upset the balance.
Another area of possible cooperation
is in damping the arms race through the
exchange of information. I am not much
impressed with the budgetary fury of
our participation in the arms race, but 
it is not hard to imagine that the budget-
ary arms race might get into much high-
er gear. If it does, part of the motivation
(at least in this country) may be due to
uncertainty about the level of armament
on the other side. The “missile gap” that




stabilizationone estimates, or feels obliged to assume
to exist in the absence of information,
may exceed the actual missile gap, caus-
ing a more frantic increase in armaments
than would be undertaken with better
information. And it may induce recipro-
cal action on the other side, which also
wishes to avoid an intolerably unfavor-
able imbalance.
To illustrate: suppose that either side
felt reasonably secure against sudden
attack as long as its enemy’s numerical
superiority in missiles never reached,
say, 2 to 1. In this case, just knowing what
each other possesses and is producing
could make possible a stable equilibrium
at a modest level of strategic armaments,
while ignorance of the enemy’s strength
might seem to require an unlimited ef-
fort to avoid falling too far behind. With
actual weapons such simple calculations
are of course impossible; but the princi-
ple is valid.
An important dif½culty of applying it,
though, is that the ways by which one
can get authentic information about the
other’s present and projected strength
may provide more strategic information
than the other side can tolerate.9A spe-
cial dif½culty is that the Soviets may al-
ready know most of what they need to
know for this purpose; it is mainly we
who do not.
But it is interesting that they might
possibly prefer that we know the truth. 
If in fact we are on the verge of a crash
program based on an exaggerated esti-
mate of what they have already done, 
it could cost them money (and perhaps
an increase in the risk of war) to keep 
up with us. It is also interesting that the
truth is probably not something that
they could readily reveal on their own.
They have to ½nd some way of giving 
us evidence for believing the truth (or a
less exaggerated estimate of the truth)
and give it in a way that does not yield
targeting and other information that
they would ½nd intolerable. The fact 
that this intelligence gap is mainly on
our side does not preclude Soviet inter-
est in some means of conveying the in-
formation to us, and it does not obviate
the need for cooperative techniques for
receiving it.
Measures to prevent “accidental war,”
war by misunderstanding, war by false
alarm, are another possibility. One as-
pect of this has been mentioned: the
reciprocal development of the kinds of
forces and modes of behavior that mini-
mize accidents or their consequences,
minimize alarms and misunderstand-
ings, minimize the need to react quickly
in the face of ambiguous evidence. But
there is another type of joint or recipro-
cal activity that could help. It would be
to arrange in advance, even if crudely
and informally, communication proce-
dures, exchange of information, and
inspection facilities, for use in the event
of an accident, alarm, or misunderstand-
ing that created a crisis. Part of this is
just procedural–making sure that we
and the Russians have the same idea
about who gets in touch with whom
when communication or bargaining is
suddenly required. Part of it is intellec-
tual–thinking ahead of time about how
one would go about reassuring the Rus-
sians in the event they had a false alarm,
and what we could demand of them for
our own reassurance if we ever got am-
biguous evidence. Part of it is physical–
making sure that, if we should need in-
spectors on a particular scene within a
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9  Also, one side yields a bluf½ng or bargain-
ing advantage if it reveals that its weaponry is
less impressive than may have been thought. 
It loses, too, the possibility of surreptitiously
achieving a dominant superiority. But losses 
of this kind are the price of arms control in 
the ½rst place.few hours to verify that something was
an accident, or to verify that the Rus-
sians were calm, or to verify that the
Russians were not taking actions we
thought they were taking, the neces-
sary inspectors and equipment would 
be available within a few hours’ travel
time from where we would need them.
Just having some Russians available at
strategic points around the United
States, able to see things with their own
eyes if we suddenly wanted them to and
able to report home instantly through
authentic channels, might be useful
someday. And if we ever want them, we
may want them in a hurry; there may
not be time to identify them, brief them,
ship them over here, and train them for
their job, once the accident occurs or the
crisis is on or the misinformation ½lters
through the Russian warning system.10
T here is a more ambitious possibility.
Neither we nor the Russians at the pres-
ent time take arms control terribly seri-
ously; we do not view it as an alternative
to a war that is imminent. But it is not
impossible to imagine crises in which
the likelihood of immediate war would
become a grave preoccupation. Once the
threat of imminent war rises above some
threshold, the mere consciousness that
each side is preoccupied with it–and
with the importance of being the one 
to start it, if it should come–will aggra-
vate the propensities that already exist.
It is perfectly conceivable that in a real
crisis there would be a sudden and dras-
tic change in the attitudes of both sides
toward arms control. “Preventive arms
control” might begin to look like a risky
but attractive alternative to a possibly
inevitable preemptive war. Sudden and
drastic “measures to safeguard against
surprise attack” might have to be nego-
tiated on an acutely demanding time
schedule.
If so, success may depend on wheth-
er one or both sides is intellectually pre-
pared for the contingency, whether some
understandings have been reached in
advance, and whether certain facilities
can be improvised to monitor whatever
arrangements might be forthcoming.
One of the important “limited” arms-
control measures that we might take in
advance of such a crisis, either by our-
selves or with our enemies, either infor-
mally or explicitly, is a development of
understandings, procedures, personnel,
and equipment, of an imaginative and
adaptable sort, capable of going into
action at such time as we and the Rus-
sians both decide that now is the time
for arms control and we can’t wait.
A½nal possibility, a pessimistic but 
a serious one and one suggested by the
analogy between arms control and limit-
ed war, is the role of arms control in gen-
eral war if general war occurs. We usual-
ly think of arms control or deterrence 
as having failed if war breaks out; and 
so it has, but it can fail worse if we give
up at that point. It is not entirely clear
that a general war–a war between the
usaand the ussr, involving their stra-
tegic forces on a large scale–would nec-
essarily be unlimited either in the way it
would be fought or in the way it would
be concluded. Particularly as we come 
to think about an inadvertent war–one
that results by some kind of accident or
misunderstanding, or one that is reluc-
tantly initiated by the Russians or by us
in the belief that it is urgent to preempt
at once–it is worthwhile to consider
whether fury is the only guide we need
in conducting the war, and whether the





10  A more extensive discussion of this point
will appear in T. C. Schelling, “Arms Control:
Proposal for a Special Surveillance Force,”
World Politics (October 1960).exhaustion of weapons on both sides is
the only condition for terminating it.
It is commonly taken for granted that
if the Russians initiate a general war it
would be in a vicious effort to extermi-
nate us both as a nation and as a people,
and that they would be so impatient to
do this as to spend valuable weapons to
create civil damage at the outset. But it 
is not obvious that a coldly calculating
enemy would afford himself the luxury
of going after cities and people when
there are more urgent targets that he 
has to destroy in order to reduce the
scale of our retaliation. Nor is it obvi-
ous that an impetuous attacker, one
whose motivation is partly the fear that
if he does not strike ½rst he will be sec-
ond, would be immune to the thought
that he might want to surrender if the
thing went badly, to accept our surren-
der if it went well, or to negotiate a truce
between those extremes. If there is no
immediate strategic need to kill our peo-
ple, it may occur to him that they are
worth more alive than dead; the threat
of killing them gives him something to
bargain with in the course of the war or
at its termination. Similarly for us: if the
war was a mistake we might be more in-
terested in minimizing the consequences
of the error, whosever error it was, and
in maintaining the possibility of a nego-
tiated outcome that limited damage on
both sides. For this bargaining purpose,
live Russians and our unspent weapons
are assets, and about the only ones we’d
have.
The subject is a complicated one and
cannot be decided here. It has to be ac-
knowledged that there are dangers in
suggesting to the Russians that we are
even aware of the possibility that an
attack on us might not be cataclysmic 
for us both. But the possibility is so uni-
versally unmentioned and so terribly
important that it deserves to be brought
into the open for study. Its relation to
arms control is that the mere possibili-
ty of limiting a general war between us
and our principal enemy may depend on
some understanding, tacit and informal
as it may be, that we share ahead of time.
There may be little national advantage 
in abstaining from certain targets in the
event of war, or in attempting to com-
municate, unless the enemy can be alert
to what is going on.
T erminating a war through anything
other than the sheer exhaustion of weap-
ons on both sides would require some
form of arms control. It is a noteworthy
characteristic of a possible World War
III that even unconditional surrender
may be physically impossible. How do
the Russians persuade us that they have
destroyed (or are prepared to destroy 
or deliver us) some or all of their signi½-
cant weapons and are prepared to sub-
mit to our political demands? We can-
not even trust them not to test weapons
under a test-suspension agreement; in
circumstances in½nitely more desper-
ate, when a one-hour pause in the war
may be of strategic bene½t to somebody,
if they send us an urgent message ac-
knowledging their guilt in the war and
proposing that we preserve our world 
by letting them surrender to us, are we
likely to be able to do anything? If they
are fooling, and if we are fooled, the cost
will be tremendous; if they are not fool-
ing and we choose to ignore them, the
cost will be tremendous. Can we think 
of what they might do to prove that they
mean it? Have we got the facilities to
monitor them and to police them? Have
we incorporated in our strategic forces,
and in the operating doctrine of those
forces, recognition of their potential 
role in policing the disarmament by
which the war might be brought to a
close?
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here. Anywhere between the two
extremes of unconditional surrender 
by one side or the other, the truce or
understanding or scheme for bringing
the war to a close might better be de-
scribed as “disarmament” or “arms 
control.” Historically one might have
allowed an enemy, when he “condition-
ally” surrendered, to keep some purely
defensive weapons as a hedge against 
the victor’s violating his promise. This 
is a kind of asymmetrical disarmament
scheme. In the future, at the close of a
general war, one might have to allow the
conditionally surrendering enemy to re-
tain some retaliatory weapons, these be-
ing the only kind that two major powers
can use to enforce promises from each
other. In effect, “measures to safeguard
against surprise attack,” possibly one-
sided, possibly bilateral, and certainly
more drastic than any that have yet been
considered, might be the minimum re-
quirement of a conditionally surrender-
ing enemy.
Thus anywhere between the two
extremes of total surrender, the out-
come should be viewed as a disarma-
ment process, with the asymmetry pre-
sumably reflecting the degree of victory
or defeat. But as remarked above, even
the extremes of unconditional surren-
der require much the same kind of pro-
cedure for mutual relaxation, cessation
of hostilities, inspection, enforcement,
and so forth. Any general war that is ter-
minated by a bilateral understanding, by
anything other than the independent ex-
haustion of weapons on both sides, re-
quires something in the nature of an
enormous, complex and dynamic
scheme for arms control.
If this possibility is to be left open, we
need to anticipate it in the design of our
strategic forces and in our plans for their
use. It may require special facilities and
equipment to bring a war to a close, of
a kind not necessarily provided for in a
plan that considers only the contingency
of an all-out war to the ½nish. But it also
requires some mutual awareness ahead
of time, on the part of both our enemy
and ourselves, and perhaps some crude
and tacit, if not careful and explicit, un-
derstanding about the modes and tech-
niques of negotiation in the event of
war.
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